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Abstract:
This paper discusses the concept of ‘externalities ‘. It starts with a brief discussion of
market failures in the neoclassical economic jramework.  It then proceeds to a
definition of externalities, thereby distinguishing external eflects  j+om  other sorts of
‘unpriced effects  ‘. Finally, some attention is paid to the relation, and tension, between
eflciency  and equity impacts of externalities.
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1. Introduction
External effects have been studied by economists ever since the days of Marshall and
Pigou. Along with the development of the field of environmental economics, the
theory of externalities has remained of great and growing importance in economic
science. Indeed, it is fair to say that, starting from the traditional neoclassical
economic framework, the most logical way to look at problems of environmental
pollution is from the perspective of external costs (see, for instance, Baumol and
Oates, 1988; Pearce and Turner, 1990; Cropper and Oates, 1992; and Tietenberg,
1994). However, although economists have been investigating the concept of
externalities for a long time, both theoretically and empirically, they still prove to be
an area of slippery ice. Frequently one finds fuzzy discussions on the policy
implications of external costs. This may often be caused by, for instance, a mixing up
of equity and allocative efficiency arguments, from mistaking pecuniary externalities
for ‘true’ or technological externalities, or from some sense of compassion with the
victims of externalities on equity grounds, leading to pleas for ‘compensation’ which
may often be unwarranted from the perspective of allocative efficiency.
This paper aims at shedding some light on the concept of ‘externalities’. It starts
with a brief discussion of market failures in the neoclassical economic framework. It
then proceeds to a definition of externalities, thereby distinguishing external effects
from other sorts of ‘unpriced effects’. Finally, some attention is paid to the relation,
and tension, between efficiency and equity impacts of externalities.
2. Paretian welfare criteria and market failures
Mainstream neo-classical micro and welfare economic theories suggest that
governments should in principle be reserved in directly intervening in the economic
process. It is broadly accepted that economic science should aim at providing ‘value
free’ descriptions and analyses of human choice, and the associated social processes,
under conditions of scarcity. As it is not possible to construct a value free social
welfare function according to some ethically objective criterion (see, for instance,
Boadway and Bruce, 1984, p. 2),  welfare economics has an inherent tendency to rely
on quite humble welfare criteria for the evaluation of different possible outcomes of
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the economic process; for instance, under different possible forms of government
intervention (including, of course, non-intervention). Among these, the strict and
potential Pareto criteria are without doubt the ones most often employed.’ The strict
Pareto criterion classifies a policy (change) to be socially desirable if, as a result,
everyone is made better off (in its weak version), or at least if one person is better off,
while no one else is made worse off (in its strong version). For most policy choices
however, both losers and gainers will be involved, and the strict Pareto criterion
becomes of limited use because does not provide any basis for choice between the
feasible alternatives. In such cases, one usually relies on well-known potential Pareto
criteria, or compensation criteria, as suggested by Kaldor (1939) and Hicks (1939).
According to these, a change is classified desirable if the winners are able to
compensate the losers such that everyone could be made better off after the change
has occurred (Kaldor), or if the losers are in the initial situation unable to compensate
the winners such that both groups would prefer to stay in the initial situation (Hicks).
Actual compensation, however, is not required according to these principles.
The related concept of Pareto efzciency  is defined as a feasible situation, usually
in terms of the allocation of goods and production factors, for which there exists no
other feasible situation that is weakly preferred to it by all agents. Therefore, if an
economy attains a Pareto efficient allocation, there remain no mutually beneficial
exchanges to be exploited. Unlike the strict Pareto criterion, the potential Pareto
criterion will always rank any Pareto efficient allocation above any Pareto inefficient
allocation (for a careful discussion, see Boadway and Bruce, 1984, p. 96-102).
However, neither the strict nor the potential Pareto criterion can say anything about
the relative desirability of different Pareto efficient allocations (see Atkinson and
Stiglitz, 1980; and Johansson, 1991).
The economists’ reservation in advocating government intervention then, is closely
related to a number of basic welfare economic theorems (see Varian, 1992, ch. 17).
The first  of these is known as the First Theorem of Welfare Economics, stating that
under certain conditions (see below), a competitive equilibrium, if it exists, is Pareto
efficient. In addition, the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics asserts that
essentially all Pareto efficient allocations can be supported by competitive equilibria
for appropriate distributions of endowments. Next, a welfare maximum for any social
welfare function that satisfies welfarism (social welfare depends only on the utility of
the households) and is Paretian (it satisfies the strict Pareto criterion) is necessarily
Pareto efficient. Finally, Pareto efficient allocations are welfare maxima under
‘For a comparison of these Pareto criteria with other social welfare criteria such as the mininial
state, the egalitarian criterion, the Benthamite criterion and the Rawlsian criterion, see Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980, pp. 336-343).
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concavity assumptions for some choice of welfare weights in a welfaristic Paretian
social welfare function, Varian (1992, ch. 17) presents formal derivations of these
theorems.
Consequently, as it is not possible to make a value free comparison between
different Pareto efficient market outcomes, the logical step for economists is to
advocate regulation only if the ‘certain conditions’ necessary for the free market to
attain Pareto efficiency, and hence a welfare maximum given the distribution of
endowments, happen not to fulfilled. The question of the desirability of the resulting
distribution is then often left aside as an ethical one, beyond the domain of
economists. Alternatively, the issue of equity is dealt with either in the light of the
initial distribution of endowments, however artificial the bench-mark concept of lump-
sum2  distributions may be in practice, or in terms of the ‘efficiency price’ that has
to be paid for attaining a desirable or satisfactory distribution through distortionary
taxes and subsidies.
The non-fulfilment of the above mentioned ‘certain conditions’ for the First
Theorem of Welfare Economics to apply is often referred to as ‘market failure’:
markets fail to accomplish Pareto efficiency. The following forms of market failure
are usually distinguished: (a) increasing returns to scale over the relevant range (falling
marginal and average variable cost curves); (b) non price taking behaviour (market
power); (c) external effects; (d) public goods; and (e) imperfect information.3  Apart
from these, two other important reasons for government intervention often mentioned
are (f) distributional or equity considerations; and (g) (de-)merit good arguments. In
this paper, the focus is on external effects. The next section discusses this concept in
some more detail.
3. A definition of externalities
Although the concept of external effects is widely used in economics, there seems to
be some confusion on its exact definition and interpretation. This justifies a short
discussion of the concept itself here. It is commonly recognized  that externalities are
2A lump-sum tax or subsidy is defined as one which is independent of the behaviour of the affected
agent. It therefore induces no substitution effect. As it usually will have an income effect, it is not
correct to claim that it has no effect on behaviour (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, p. 28).
‘A somewhat different terminology may be encountered in the literature, where one speaks of
‘externalities’ to indicate what is called ‘market failures’ above. Bator (1958)  for instance, uses
‘technical externalities’ to indicate ‘scale economies’; ‘public good externalities’ to indicate ‘public
goods’; and ‘ownership externalities’ to indicate ‘externalities’ as used in this chapter. The latter only
refer to ‘technological externalities’, as opposed to ‘pecuniary externalities’ (see the discussion in the
main text). Conversely, the term ‘market failure’ is sometimes reserved solely to indicate a market’s
non-existence (its ‘failure to exist’), which is the fundamental reason for technological externalities to
occur.
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an important form of market failure. Their existence leads to a deviation from the
first-best neo-classical world, in which the price mechanism takes care of an efficient
resource allocation (Pareto efficiency). In the presence of externalities, market prices
do not reflect full social costs (or benefits), and, for instance, regulatory taxes (or
subsidies) are called for to restore the efficient workings of the market mechanism.
Furthermore, it is generally accepted that the source of externalities is typically to be
found in the absence of well-defined property rights (see Baumol and Oates, 1988, p.
26). Consequently, the theory of externalities is often applied in environmental
economics: environmental quality is a typical ‘good’ for which property rights are not
defined and hence no market exists.
These commonplaces may clearly indicate the causes and consequences of external
effects, but still leave the definition unclear. Such a definition can be as follows: an
external effect exists when an actor’s (the receptor’s) utility (or production) function
contains a real variable whose actual value depends on the behaviour of another actor
(the supplier), who does not take this effect of his behaviour into account in his
decision making process. This definition is in line with, for instance, Mishan (1971).
In the terminology of Viner (193 1) and Scitovsky (1954),  the above definition
concerns ‘technological’ externalities, as opposed to ‘pecuniary externalities’. 4 These
latter, which are ruled out by considering real variables only (that is, excluding
monetary variables), do not lead to shifts of production and utility functions, but
merely to movements along these functions (see also the discussion of Figure 1
below). Consequently, externalities as defined above are, in the terminology of
Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962),  potentially ‘Pareto-relevant’ (if the costs of
correcting for the market failure do not exceed the welfare gains to be obtained),
whereas pecuniary externalities are not, because they do not reflect a failing market
(see also Mishan, 1971). The final condition in the definition distinguishes externalities
from other types of unpriced interactions, such as barter, violence, jealousy, altruism
or goodwill-promoting activities (for instance, handing out samples of products as part
of a commercial campaign). Such phenomena differ fundamentally from external
effects, both in a theoretical and in a policy-relevance sense. According to Mishan
(1971), “the essential feature of an external effect [is] that the effect produced is not
a deliberate creation but an unintended or incidental by-product of some otherwise
legitimate activity” (p. 2).
The unresolved tension between the receptor, who has no direct control over the
size of the effect at its source, and the supplier, who has no a priori interest in the
magnitude of the externality, can only persist provided there is no market on which
4Note  that Bator’s ‘technical externalities’ (footnote 3) are completely different from Viner’s and
Scitovsky’s ‘technological externalities’.
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the externality is traded. This stems from a lack of well defined property rights
concerning the externality, which is in turn often related to prohibitive high transaction
costs. As pointed out by Coase (1960),  in the absence of transaction costs, both the
supplier and the receptor of the externality can benefit from negotiations on the size
of the externality. ‘Corrective’ Pigouvian taxation would in that case only distort the
resulting Pareto efficient outcome, as pointed out by Turvey (1963).
Within the above defined class of technological externalities, various further
distinctions can be made. One of these is between depletable and undepletable
externalities, where in the latter case, the consumption of the externality by the one
receptor does not affect the consumption by other receptors. Therefore, an
undepletable externality in fact exhibits two types of market failure at the same time:
the external effect itself, and a public good (or bad) character. After an interesting
discussion in the literature, the consensus now is that this distinction does not imply
different pricing rules for each type of externality (Freeman, 1984; Bird, 1987; Peskin,
1988; Bird, 1988; Oates, 1988). Nevertheless, it has been shown elsewhere (Verhoef,
1994) that the Coasian solution to externality optimization may easily fail for
undepletable externalities due to strategic behaviour and free riding (which is
intuitively easy to understand for those who are familiar with the theory of voluntary
private provision of public goods; see for instance Bergstrom, Blume and Varian,
1986).5  Another specific type of technological externality that is sometimes
distinguished concerns congestion externalities, where each actor is at the same time
both supplier and receptor of the effect. Probably the most important form of this type
of externality is road traffic congestion. This topic is studied in great depth by
transport economists; for a literature review, see for instance Verhoef (1996). It is in
this respect an interesting detail that economists like Pigou (1920, p. 194) and Knight
(1924) used the example of a congested highway as an illustration of the points they
had to make on externality regulation.
The question of whether unpriced external relations are either external effects or
other types of unpriced external relations involves important policy consequences. This
is illustrated in a partial equilibrium setting in Figure 1 for a certain activity Q. The
standard case in Figure la shows the optimal workings of the market mechanism in
absence of external effects. In this case, no government intervention is called for:
market forces secure social welfare maximization (the bold triangle) at the market
equilibrium Q”, where marginal private cost (MPC) equals marginal private benefits
(MPB). The algebraic sum of total benefits (the area under the MPB curve) minus
‘Another relevant sort of market failure that has been studied in joint occurrence with externalities
concerns monopolistic market power (see, for instance, Buchanan, 1969; Bamett, 1980; Oates and
Strassmann, 1984; and Carraro (1997).
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total (variable) cost (the area under the MPC curve) is therefore maximized. MPB and
MPC can be interpreted as the benefits and costs as experienced by one actor. They
can also be thought of as demand and supply curves for a marketed good, in which
case P” is the market clearing (efficient) price.
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Figure 1. Graphical representation of external costs, external bene$ts and
pecuniary beneJits
The existence of (marginal) external costs (MEC) in Figure lb drives a wedge
between marginal social cost (MSC) and marginal private cost (the fact that both MPC
and MEC are equal to 0 at Q=O and rising afterwards is an arbitrary choice, and does
in principle not affect the generality of the discussion)6.  The market outcome Q”,
where private welfare is maximized, is not optimal from a social point of view. The
resulting level of the external cost (A+B+C)  is excessively large. Social welfare
maximization requires the activity to be restricted to a level of Q’, where the marginal
social cost is equal to the marginal benefits and the dead-weight welfare loss C is
avoided. This optimum can for instance be accomplished by means of a quantitative
6Although  it is fair to acknowledge that in case of a non-convex external cost function, things may
become a lot more complicated; see for instance Burrows (1995).
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restriction (Q’) or a Pigouvian tax (t*)  on the activity.7  The triangle A gives the
optimal level of the external cost. The bold triangle again represents maximum social
welfare.
Two points are perhaps worth stressing here. First, it is now easy to see that, in
order to be able to speak of the optimal level of an externality, it is convenient to
adapt the potential Pareto criterion for welfare evaluation. According to the strict
Pareto criterion, the move from Q” to Q’  is a welfare improvement only if
accompanied by an appropriate (lump sum) compensation to the supplier of the
externality. Secondly, the optimization of an externality does clearly not mean its
minimization (or maximization).
Figure Ic shows the reverse case, where (marginal) external benefits (MEB) exist.
Marginal social benefits (MSB) now exceed the marginal private benefits. In this case,
social welfare maximization requires encouragement of the activity up to Q’,  for
instance by means of Pigouvian subsidization (s’).
Finally, Figure Id  illustrates the case of pecuniary benefits. Figure 1 b serves as a
starting point, assuming that the activity gives rise to external costs. Suppose the
private cost curve shifts downwards, perhaps due to another producer leaving the
region, causing labour costs to fall. Assuming unaltered external costs, MSC will fall
as well. A new social optimum Q2*, with a higher social welfare arises: the bold
triangle is increased in comparison with Figure lb. Moreover, if Q is a traded good
and MPB reflects market demand, the consumer surplus increases by the shaded area.
This results from the lower market price P,*  and the larger quantity sold Q2*.  This
benefit, however, is not external but pecuniary: it results from a movement along -
not a shift in - the MPB curve. The pecuniary benefits do not ‘compensate’ for the
external costs: social welfare maximization still requires a restriction from the new
unregulated market outcome Q2’  to the new social optimum Q2*.  For the move from
the old to the new social optimum (from Q,*  to Q2*)  itself, however - given the use
of optimal Pigouvian taxes in both the old and the new situation - market forces can
be relied upon, and there is no reason for stimulating the activity, unlike in case of
external benefits. Consequently, the question of whether unpriced costs and benefits
of a certain activity are either external or pecuniary in nature is crucial from a policy
point of view.
‘The present equivalence between a regulatory tax and a non-economic instrument such as a
quantitative restriction is of course due to the extreme simplicity of the current setting. For instance,
under uncertainty, this equivalence no longer holds (see Weitzman, 1974; and Adar and Griffin, 1976)
nor does it when heterogeneity among the generators of externalities exists. However, in this rather
brief contribution, I will not focus too much on the efficiency in the regulation of externalities; Baumol
and Oates (1988),  Cropper and Oates (1992)  and Tietenberg (1994) offer excellent analyses and
reviews of this literature (see also Helfand, 1997; and Russell and Powell, 1997).
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As already mentioned in footnote 7, this paper will not discuss the efficiency of
various forms of the regulation of externalities in great detail. One more general point
concerning the policy implications of externalities, however, deserves some attention.
This concerns the distinction between the optimization, the compensation, the
internalization and the regulation of an externality. These concepts are often used in
a rather loose way, whereas a more careful consideration reveals that they are certainly
neither identical nor interchangeable. The optimization of an external effect can be
defined as follows: an externality is optimized when its level is consistent with optimal
resource allocation according to the potential Pareto criterion (see above). The
compensation of an external effect can be defined as follows: an externality is
compensated when a (financial) transaction takes place between the supplier and the
receptor of the effect, which compensates for the receptor’s welfare effects due to the
externality. The compensation of an externality does not necessarily imply its
optimization, because it may induce inefficient behaviour of the victim(s) of the effect
(see also the next section). Next, the internalization of an external effect involves the
removal of its external character, making it ‘internal to the economic process’
(Mishan, 197 1,  p. 3): an externality is intemalized if a market for the effect comes into
being.* Intemalization typically involves either the creation of a market on which the
externality is traded, or a gathering of interest, such as a merger in case of a producer-
producer externality, the standard example being water pollution by an upstream firm
damaging the product of a downstream firm. The former requires the assignment of
property rights, after which ‘Coasian negotiations’ between the supplier and the
receptor of the effect will lead to the social optimum - at least in theory (Coase,
1960). Should such negotiations lead to compensation of the effect, in particular when
the receptor of an external cost obtains the property right, then compensation need not
be at odds with optimization (this is probably what Pearce and Turner (1990, p. 61)
have in mind when stating that a necessary condition for an external cost to prevail
is that the loss in welfare be uncompensated). Finally, the term regulation can be used
for direct government intervention regarding the externality, by means of, for instance,
price instruments, command and control measures, tradeable permits, or any other
means.
4. Efficiency and equity impacts of externalities
Externalities comprise both efficiency and equity aspects. The first refer to the fact
that, in the presence of externalities, the competitive market outcome is not Pareto
efficient. The second relate to the fact that the receptors of a negative (positive)
‘Pigouvian taxation is often referred to as ‘intemalization’ of an externality. However, such market-
conform regulation actually does not satisfy this definition of intemalization.
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externality are clearly worse (better) off at any non-zero level of the effect, unless
compensation takes place. Unfortunately, there is no straightforward one-to-one
mapping between the two goals of efficient allocation and ‘equitable distribution’,
however defined. One can therefore arrive at rather different policy recommendations
on the regulation of externalities, depending on the viewpoint taken.
First of all, let us consider the welfare of the receptors of an external cost. It seems
reasonable that, from an equity point of view, Pigouvian tax revenues should be used
to compensate the receptors of the external cost for the remaining optimal level of the
externality. However, this turns out to be problematic as soon as the receptor of an
externality is able to protect him- or herself by means of defensive measures (such as
double glazing in case of noise annoyance, or relocation in case of localized
externalities). In Verhoef (1994),  this problem is investigated in several settings, and
a main conclusion is that it is in general not in line with overall efficient allocation
to compensate receptors for the external cost suffered, nor for any defensive measures
undertaken. In some cases, in particular in case of a localized undepletable externality,
efficient allocation even requires taxation of receptors in order to secure the optimal
number of receptors of an external cost. Compensation would discourage receptors of
external costs from undertaking the optimal level of defensive measures. Hence, for
the optimal efficient allocation, one might end up in a situation which is not very
attractive from the equity point of view, namely where receptors of an external cost
not only remain uncompensated for the externality they suffer, but should also be
(financially) responsible for their own defensive measures (see also Shibata and
Winrich,  1983; and Oates, 1983). A trade-off between efficiency and equity
considerations is therefore unavoidable in such cases.
Related to this issue, and unattractive from an equity point of view, is the
requirement that the valuation of external costs should be based on the receptors’
willingness to pay for their avoidance, or their willingness to accept their existence.’
It is not difficult to show that this value, apart from being directly related to the
marginal disutility of the effect itself, is inversely related to the marginal utility of
income (for a formal derivation see Verhoef, 1994). This means that, other things
being equal, the same exposure to a negative external effect implies a higher external
cost for higher income receptors. The inequitable implications of this property are
evident: an externality generating activity should then, from the efficiency point of
view, be located near low income rather than near high income receptors. This is
closely related to the issue of ‘environmental dumping’; see, for instance, Harrison
(1994).
91n  theory, these two measures should be equal at the margin. Empirical research with contingent
valuation methods, however, suggests otherwise (see Mitchell and Carson, 1989, pp. 30-38).
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Focusing on the generators of externalities there is often a further tension between
allocative efficiency, and what seems to be just from the equity point of view. For
instance, consider the Polluter Pays Principle. Taking Figure lb as an example,
optimal Pigouvian taxation implies a total tax sum Q**t*,  which is in the sketched case
twice as large as the optimal level of the external cost (area A). Hence, the question
of whether the polluter should pay the total external cost, or whether marginal tax
rules should be used, may often lead to different outcomes in terms of both allocative
efficiency and equity - unless of course marginal external costs are constant and
therefore equal to average external costs. This ambiguity in the interpretation of the
Polluter Pays Principle, unfortunately, is often overlooked.
Also relevant for the generators of externalities is the fact that people may often
be opposed to price measures in the regulation of congestion type of externalities for
equity reasons. For road transport, the typical statement is: “Why should we (the road
users) pay for something that only harms ourselves (congestion)?“. Although it is not
difficult to see that the appropriate level of aggregation at which to study optimal
Pigouvian taxes is the individual (not the sector), such statements are nevertheless
persistent in policy debates due to their intuitively convincing appeal to feelings of
‘fairness’. Other important issues related to the public acceptance of congestion
charges include its regressive incidence, the fact that most road users will be net losers
if the tax revenues are not redistributed, and the allocation of the tax revenues
generated (see Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld, 1997).
Given such tensions between efficiency and equity considerations, it is no surprise
that the mixing up of equity and allocative efficiency arguments may often lead to
rather fuzzy discussions about the policy implications of research findings on external
costs. Table 1 gives an overview of the most important characteristics and implications
of taking these two perspectives for the case of road transport, demonstrating the
absence of a direct mapping between the two, and hence identifying some sources of
confusion in the above mentioned discussions (see Verhoef, 1996, for a further
discussion of this table).
Also in the practice of policy making, equity considerations are often at least as
important as the expected efficiency of various possible instruments. This is narrowly
related to the problem of the social and political feasibility of regulation. Figure 2,
more or less repeating Figure lb, can be used to illustrate the basic issue. A certain
actor, ‘the producer’, performs an activity Q, from which he enjoys net private
benefits (private benefits minus private costs). However, he causes an external cost -
say, pollution - to another actor: ‘the victim’. The curves represent the marginal net
private benefits (MNPB = MPB-MPC) and marginal external cost (MEC) of
production. Without government intervention, a production level of Q” prevails,
whereas the social optimum is again given by Q*.
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Goal of the analysis
Relevant external cost measure
Apt level  of aggregation
Relevant external cost
categories
Relevance of some existing
financial  transfers:
Defensive outlays by
receptors
Insurance premiums
Car ownership taxes
Indirect taxes on fuel
Allocative efficiency
perspective
Assessment of  ‘optimal
road mobility’ and optimal
regulatory taxes
Marginal external cost
Individual
Intra-sectoral and inter-
sectoral  external costs
Should not  be accounted for
in optimal taxes
Very limited relevancea
Very limited relevancea
Potential relevanced
Equity perspective
(‘unpaid bill’)
Assessment  of  the total  costs
shif ted to society at  large
Total external cost plus  induced
defensive outlays
Sectoral
Inter-sectoral external costs
Should be added to ‘unpaid bill’
Limited relevanceb
Relevantc
Potential relevancee
a These transfers are usually fixed yearly payments, (largely) independent of total kilometres driven.
Hence, they have no direct impact on road usage.
b A certain share of accident costs ( including fatali t ies) are intra-sectoral ,  and hence should not play a role
in the ‘unpaid bill’ analysis. Neither should therefore a certain share of the insurance premiums.
Moreover,  from the perspective of the ‘unpaid bil l’ ,  the relevant question is  whether the payments from
the insurance companies to society are enough to cover the costs  posed on the rest  of  the society.
c These taxes are a relevant coverage for part of the ‘unpaid bill’ only if they exceed government outlays
on infrastructure (depreciation, maintenance, management, police, etc.).
d For Pigouvian taxation using fuel taxes, the tax rate on fuel needs to exceed those of indirect taxes on
other goods (forgetting here about the ‘optimal taxation’ argument for the sake of simplicity; see for
instance Sandmo, 1976).
e Also here, only any indirect taxes above average rates can be considered as relevant transfers from road
users to society, compensating for part of the unpaid bill.
Table 1. Characteristics and implications of the allocative eficiency  versus the equity
perspective for studying external costs of road transport
In the literature, certain ‘standard’ schemes can be found which yield this social
optimum. Three categories of such schemes are considered below. First, two forms of
regulation are distinguished: quantitative restrictions lo and Pigouvian taxation. The
second scheme is direct compensation from the producer to the victim. Finally, two
forms of internalization are considered: a gathering of interest through a merger of the
victim and the producer, which will often be impossible for very practical reasons; and
the assignment of property rights concerning the externality, either to the producer or
“Tradeable  permits are not considered because the model contains only one producer.
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Figure 2. Ejkiency  and equity implications of an external cost
.
I
$
to the victim, which is assumed to result in Coasian negotiations.
Table 2 shows the distributional impacts of these schemes. Although in this simple
setting each of them yields the efficient outcome, that is the maximum social welfare
of A+B, they have different distributional implications. Most of the values in Table
2 can easily be verified with reference to Figure 2. However, Coasian negotiations
deserve some closer attention. Here, the distributional implications depend on the
distribution of property rights as well as on individual bargaining skills. The former
determines the direction of the financial transfer; the latter determine its size. For both
distributions of property rights, transfers between the extremes in Table 2 may occur.
These boundary values follow from the fact that the MNPB gives the producer’s
minimum willingness to accept (maximum willingness to pay) for decreases
(increases) in production, whereas MEC represents the victim’s minimum willingness
to accept (maximum willingness to pay) for increases (decreases) in the production
level. I1  Note that, when the property right is assigned to the producer, the associated
financial transfer has the direction opposite to compensation of the external cost. Full
compensation takes place when the property right is assigned to the victim, while the
producer is the extreme best bargainer. As a matter of fact, direct compensation can
be seen as a restricted case of Coasian negotiations. The property right is implicitly
“The maximum transfer from the victim to the producer (D+E)  mentioned assumes that the
producer is truthful. If he pretends considering a production level above Q”,  the victim is willing to pay
more than D+E in order to secure Q’. The victim does not have a comparable possibility of ‘cheating’.
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assigned to the victim, but he is not allowed to bargain over the size of the
compensation.
NON-INTERVENTION
REGULATION:
Quantitative restriction (Q’)
Pigouvian tax (t’)’
DIRECT COMPENSATION
INTERNALIZATION:
Gathering of interest
Coasian negot ia t ions  ‘a
Coasian negot ia t ions  2b
Coasian negot ia t ions  3 a
Producer Victim Regu-
lator
Social
A +B+c+D
A+B+C
A+B+C-[B+C]=A
A+B+C-(C)=A+B
A+B
A+B+C+(D+E)
A+B+C+(D)
A+B+C-(C)=A+B
- C - D - E 0
- c 0
- c /B+C/
-c+(c)=0 0
0
-C-(D+E) 0
- C - ( D ) 0
-C+(C)=0 0
A + B - E
A+B
A+B
A+B
A+B
A+B
A+B
A+B
Coasian negot ia t ions  3b A+B+C-(A+B+C)=O -C+(A+B+C)=A+B 0 A+B
Terms between normal brackets indicate financial transfers between the producer and the victim, and
between square brackets between the producer and the regulator.
I I t  is  assumed that  the producer and the vict im do not  consider  the al locat ion of  Pigouvian tax revenues.
2 a Property right lies with the producer; the producer is the extreme best bargainer.
2b Property right lies with the producer; the victim is the extreme best bargainer.
3 a Property right lies with the victim; the producer is the extreme best bargainer.
3b Property right lies with the victim; the victim is the extreme best bargainer.
Table 2. The individual welfare positions associated with different schemes for
optimizing externalities in a basic model
Table 2 indicates that the actors have different rankings of the different schemes. The
producer prefers Coasian negotiations with the property rights assigned to himself. He
may then realize a welfare level above the level he enjoys with unrestricted
production. His second favourite is non-intervention. Next comes a quantitative
restriction, followed by direct compensation and finally either Coasian negotiations
with the property right assigned to the victim, or Pigouvian taxation, depending on the
distribution of bargaining skills (the above ranking of compensation, Coasian
negotiations with the property right assigned to the victim and Pigouvian taxation in
addition depends on the assumption of rising marginal external cost). The victim
prefers receiving the property rights and the associated Coasian negotiations. Next
comes direct compensation, followed by any form of regulation. Then comes Coasian
negotiations with the property rights assigned to the producer and finally non-
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intervention. The ‘gathering of interest’ possibility can for obvious reasons not be
qualified along this criterion.
Of course, the above analysis is rather simplistic because it only considers one
single producer of the externality and one single victim (who, in addition, is not able
to defend himself). These assumptions are relaxed in Verhoef (1994). Nevertheless,
these rankings may to some extent explain why some policies are used more often
than others. For example, considering regulation, the producer prefers a quantitative
restriction to Pigouvian taxation, whereas the victim is indifferent, assuming he does
not consider the possible allocation of the tax revenues. A vote-maximizing
government may therefore prefer to use command-and-control measures rather than
economic instruments, which seems to be confirmed by practical evidence I2  (see also
Pearce and Turner, 1990, pp. 96-8).
5. Conclusion
This paper provided a discussion of externalities, which is a key concept in (neo-
classical) environmental economics. However, although externalities have been studied
by economists for a long time already, they still prove to be an area of slippery ice.
A number of potential sources of confusion and ambiguity were addressed above.
These include the definition of externalities, where it is very important to distinguish
between externalities and other unpriced effects. Another source of ambiguity lies in
the tension between efficiency and equity impacts of externalities and their regulation.
In this respect, the role of receptors of an external cost, the ambiguity of the Polluter
Pays Principle, and the distributional impacts of regulation in relation to the social
feasibility were discussed. Depending on the viewpoint taken (that is, efficiency versus
equity or fairness), one may often arrive at diverging policy recommendations. The
aim of the above discussion was not to solve these questions, but merely to identify
them, which in itself could be a first step towards a more careful treatment of
externalities in scientific and policy debates.
‘*Other  possible reasons for preferring either price or quantity measures have been put forward.
Weitzman (1974) in his seminal paper, focuses on the relative efficiency of both types of regulation
under uncertainty (see also Baumol and Oates, 1988). A bit closer to equity arguments as considered
here, Buchanan and Tullock (1975) argue in another classic paper that quantity measures are preferred
by producers since these can act as a barrier to entry and may therefore leave them with higher profits.
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